Strategy Selection Versus Strategy Blending: A Predictive Perspective on Single- and Multi-Strategy Accounts in Multiple-Cue Estimation by Herzog, Stefan M & von Helversen, Bettina
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Strategy Selection Versus Strategy Blending: A Predictive Perspective on
Single- and Multi-Strategy Accounts in Multiple-Cue Estimation
Herzog, Stefan M; von Helversen, Bettina
Abstract: The claim that a person can use different strategies or processes to solve the same task is
pervasive in decision making, categorization, estimation, reasoning, and other research fields. Yet such
multi-strategy approaches differ widely in how they envision that the different strategies are coordinated
and therefore do not represent one unitary approach. Toolbox models, for example, assume that people
shift from one strategy to another as they adapt to specific task environments based on past experience.
Unlike such multi-strategy selection approaches, multi-strategy blending approaches assume that the
outputs of different strategies are blended into a joint, hybrid response (i.e., “wisdom of strategies” in
one mind). The goal of this article is twofold. First, we discuss strategy blending as a conceptual
alternative to strategy selection for modeling human judgment. Second, we investigate the predictive
performance of the different approaches in synthetic and real-world environments. Taking a normative
perspective, we study the coordination of rule-based and exemplar-based processes in estimation tasks.
Our simulations using synthetic and real-world environments indicate that, for medium-sized samples,
multi-strategy blending approaches lead to more accurate estimates than relying on a single strategy
or selecting a strategy based on past experience—possibly because neither rule- nor exemplar-based
processes in isolation are sufficient to capture statistical regularities that enable accurate estimates. This
suggests that multi-strategy blending approaches can be advantageous to the degree that they rely on
qualitatively different strategies.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1958
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-135887
Journal Article
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Herzog, Stefan M; von Helversen, Bettina (2018). Strategy Selection Versus Strategy Blending: A Pre-
dictive Perspective on Single- and Multi-Strategy Accounts in Multiple-Cue Estimation. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 31(2):233-249.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1958
This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the 
article. The final article is available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/bdm.1958 
Reference: 
Herzog, S. M., & von Helversen, B. (2018). Strategy Selection Versus Strategy Blending: A Predictive 
Perspective on Single‐and Multi‐Strategy Accounts in Multiple‐Cue Estimation. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 31(2), 233-249. doi: 10.1002/bdm.1958 
Strategy Selection versus Strategy Blending: 
A Predictive Perspective on Single- and Multi-Strategy Accounts in Multiple-Cue Estimation 
Stefan M. Herzog 
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany 
Bettina von Helversen 
University of Zurich, Switzerland 
Author Note 
Stefan M. Herzog, Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development, Berlin, Germany; Bettina von Helversen, Department of Psychology, University of 
Zurich, Switzerland.  
We thank Susannah Goss for editing the manuscript, and the Swiss National Science Foundation 
for a grant to the first author (100014_129572/1) and a grant to the second author (100014_146169).  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stefan M. Herzog, Center for 
Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, 
Germany. E-mail: herzog@mpib-berlin.mpg.de 
This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of 
Self-Archived Versions.
STRATEGY SELECTION VS. BLENDING 
 
2 
Abstract 
The claim that a person can use different strategies or processes to solve the same task is pervasive in 
decision making, categorization, estimation, reasoning, and other research fields. Yet such multi-strategy 
approaches differ widely in how they envision that the different strategies are coordinated and therefore 
do not represent one unitary approach. Toolbox models, for example, assume that people shift from one 
strategy to another as they adapt to specific task environments based on past experience. Unlike such 
multi-strategy selection approaches, multi-strategy blending approaches assume that the outputs of 
different strategies are blended into a joint, hybrid response (i.e., “wisdom of strategies” in one mind). 
The goal of this article is twofold. First, we introduce strategy blending as a conceptual alternative to 
strategy selection for modeling human judgment. Second, we investigate the predictive performance of 
the different approaches in synthetic and real-world environments. Taking a normative perspective, we 
study the coordination of rule-based and exemplar-based processes in estimation tasks. Our simulations 
using synthetic and real-world environments indicate that, for medium-sized samples, multi-strategy 
blending approaches lead to more accurate estimates than relying on a single strategy or selecting a 
strategy based on past experience—possibly because neither rule- nor exemplar-based processes in 
isolation are sufficient to capture statistical regularities that enable accurate estimates. This suggests that 
multi-strategy blending approaches can be advantageous to the degree that they rely on qualitatively 
different strategies. (231 words) 
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Introduction 
The claim that a person can use different strategies or processes to solve the same task is 
pervasive in decision making, categorization, estimation, reasoning, and other research fields (see, e.g., 
Marewski & Link, 2014; Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013, for reviews and discussion). 
In decision making, for example, multi-strategy approaches assume that people have a variety of 
decision strategies at their disposal and that they select among those strategies depending on task 
affordances (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Similarly, estimation and 
categorization research assumes that people recruit various strategies, including exemplar-based 
strategies, procedural strategies, and rule-based strategies (e.g., Anderson & Betz, 2001; Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). 
Multi-strategy approaches differ widely in how they envision that different strategies are 
coordinated and therefore do not represent one unitary approach. Toolbox models (e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2001), for example, assume that people have different strategies at their disposal (i.e., the 
“toolbox”) and that they shift from one strategy to another as they adapt to specific task environments—
gravitating towards strategies that are likely to succeed in the task at hand (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne et al., 2013). Such toolbox 
models have been proposed in decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne et al., 1993; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne et al., 2013) as well as in categorization and estimation research 
(Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky et al., 1994; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Some authors assume that a decision maker can, for example, use the 
take-the-best strategy for one object or task and a weighted additive strategy for the next, with no 
intermediate state between the two strategies being possible (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; 2006; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006; Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014). Similarly, the categorization model COVIS 
assumes that implicit procedural and explicit rule-based processes “race” for an answer, with the faster 
one determining the response (Anderson & Betz, 2001; Ashby et al., 1998). In contrast to toolbox 
models, which insist on shifting from one strategy to the next, hybrid models (e.g., Erickson & Kruschke, 
1998) allow not only for opportunistic switching between processes, but also for the blending1 of 
                                                
1 Note that we use the term blending as short hand for averaging the outputs of more than one strategy into one joint response. This use of 
the term should thus not be confused with, for example, blended retrieval of chunks or the creation of new production rules (i.e., production 
compilation) in ACT-R (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere, & Qin, 2004; Thomson, Lebiere, Anderson, & Staszewski, 2015). 
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different strategies’ outputs into a joint, hybrid response—for example by taking a weighted average of 
the strategies’ outputs as a response (i.e., “wisdom of strategies” in a single mind).  
The goals of this article are twofold: First, on a conceptual level, we discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of strategy blending as an alternative multi-strategy approach for modeling human 
judgment beyond strategy selection. Second, we investigate the predictive performance of various 
coordination schemes—strategy selection, strategy blending, and others—in estimating real-world 
quantities (e.g., National Football League scores). More specifically, based on empirical evidence that 
people use exemplar-based and rule-based strategies when estimating quantities (e.g., Juslin et al., 2008; 
von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009), we compare—across a set of synthetic and real-world data sets—the 
predictive accuracy of relying on one of these strategies, selecting the strategy that performed better in 
the past, or blending the output of the strategies into a joint response. Building on descriptive research of 
actual human judgment (see our literature review below), we thus take a normative perspective and 
study, by means of simulation, how successful these coordination schemes are in predicting external, 
real-world criteria.  
Assuming that human cognition is an adaptation that evolved to solve real-world problems (e.g., 
Anderson, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Todd, Gigerenzer, the ABC Research Group, 2012), a 
normative approach is an important complement to the descriptive study of human behavior. It can 
inform descriptive approaches by showing how well specific strategies fare in real-world tasks and can 
help to generate hypotheses—for example, about when humans will rely on which strategies. Here, we 
follow the approach taken by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer, Todd, ABC Research Group, 
1999; Todd et al., 2012) and focus on judgment accuracy as the criterion of interest. In the following, we 
first describe the estimation strategies and coordination schemes in more detail and then report 
simulations comparing their predictive accuracy in synthetic and real-world environments. 
Models of Estimation and Categorization 
Judging quantities, categorizing objects, and making decisions are all crucial tasks for successful 
human behavior. People executing these tasks use the attributes of an object—such as the features of a 
digital camera—to infer its value on an unknown criterion (estimation: e.g., the camera’s worth), 
classify it to a category (classification: e.g., compact vs. bridge camera), or decide among objects 
(decision: choose which camera to buy). A vast and diverse literature in cognitive science and judgment 
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and decision making has investigated how people achieve these tasks (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; 
Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Kruschke, 2008; Payne et al., 1993). 
The different models and strategies proposed can be broadly classified into two classes with 
respect to the cognitive processes they assume (Hahn & Chater, 1998): First, similarity- or exemplar-
based processes use the similarity to previously encountered cases to make estimates, categorizations, 
and decisions. Second, rule-based processes rely on previously abstracted rules that define the 
relationship between a specific piece of information and the criterion. There is clear evidence that the 
same people rely on both kinds of processes and that which of the two processes they use depends on the 
task. For example, exemplar-based processes are more prevalent than rule-based processes when people 
do not know which cue values indicate a specific category or a high criterion value (e.g., whether high 
or low blood pressure should be considered more dangerous; Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Newell, 
Weston, Tunney, & Shanks, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 
2013), when only a small number of exemplars is known (Homa, Proulx, & Blair, 2008; Rouder & 
Ratcliff, 2006), or when the criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2013; 2014; Juslin et al., 2008)—and vice versa. Most research on exemplar- and rule-based 
processes in estimation and categorization assumes that people switch between strategies (Juslin et al., 
2008; Nosofsky et al., 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009)—that is, for any object, a response is 
determined by either a rule or an exemplar-based strategy, but never by both. For example, the Rule-
plus-Exception model (RULEX) assumes that people first try simple one-dimensional rules and that they 
only recruit exemplar-based processes to store exceptions from such rules (Nosofsky et al., 1994). 
Hybrid models, in contrast, allow for a combination of both processes. For example, ATRIUM 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008) assumes that people have two “experts” in 
their mind: an exemplar-based and a rule-based module, whose outputs are processed by a gating 
mechanism. This gating mechanism can select between these modules or blend their outputs by 
averaging their responses. In addition, ATRIUM can learn to rely more strongly on the more successful 
module in terms of the probability of selecting one module over the other or in terms of the weight put 
on each model when blending them. This can be done either for the whole task or depending on the 
object to be categorized (allowing people to learn, for example, exceptions to rules). Thus, ATRIUM not 
only enables people to rely exclusively on rule-based or exemplar-based processes, but also allows 
intermediate solutions.  
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Whether people switch between or blend strategies is still an open empirical question. As 
reviewed above, extensive research within the strategy-selection framework has provided evidence that 
the strategy that best describes peoples’ estimation or categorizations depends on the task. However, 
most of this research did not test the strategy-selection account against a strategy-blending account. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence indicating that exemplar- and rule-based processes simultaneously 
influence how humans categorize (e.g., Brooks & Hannah, 2006; Erickson, 2008; Hahn, Prat-Sala, 
Pothos, & Brumby, 2010) or make estimates (von Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2014) based on 
multiple cues. These findings are consistent with a strategy-blending but not with a strategy-selection 
account. For example, Hahn and colleagues (2010) found that—even when instructed to use a rule—
participants categorized new cases that were similar to previous cases faster than cases that were 
dissimilar to previous cases, and made fewer errors doing so. Similarly, von Helversen and colleagues 
(2014) found that the similarity to previously seen candidates influenced how positively job candidates 
were judged, even though participants combined information about the candidates’ résumés in a rule-
based manner.  
Here, we use a simulation approach to investigate whether selecting or blending rule-based and 
exemplar-based processes is more advantageous in estimation problems, that is, in predicting real-world 
criteria from a set of cues. In the following, we first describe how we implemented exemplar-based and 
rule-based processes on a computational level (Marr, 1982) and then discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of strategy selection and strategy blending.   
Exemplar model 
To represent an exemplar-based estimation process, we used an exemplar model for multiple-cue 
estimates (Juslin et al., 2008) that extends the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1984) to 
estimation. The model assumes that an estimate ŷ of the criterion value of a new object is based on the 
similarity of the object p to every exemplar i stored in memory, where the estimate ŷ is an average of the 
criterion values xi of the stored exemplars weighted by their similarity to the target object S(p, i):  
,
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where I is the total number of exemplars stored in memory. The similarity S(p, i) between an object and 
an exemplar is assumed to be a nonlinear function of the distance d between the two objects,  
 ! !, ! =  !!!(!,!),      (2) 
where d is a function of the difference between the objects’ values on each attribute dimension c1 ... cj, 
the importance of each cue dimension measured by an attention parameter s, and a sensitivity parameter 
h that reflects the discriminability in psychological space (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998): ! !, ! = ℎ !! !!" − !!"!!!!     (3) 
 
Two main implementations of the exemplar model are used in the literature: (a) a full version 
that allows the attention given to each cue to differ and (b) a simplified version with a single free 
parameter determining the similarity gradient, thus assuming that s is the same for all cue dimensions. In 
support of the full version, it has been argued that exemplar models with unequal attention weights 
provide a more adequate representation of exemplar-based processes in human categorization, 
estimation, and decision making (e.g., Anderson & Betz, 2001; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 
2008; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005). However, other researchers have argued that a core conceptual 
difference between rule-based and similarity-based cognitive processes is that rule-based processes 
focus on a subset of the available dimensions, whereas similarity-based processes spread their attention 
across more dimensions (Hahn et al., 2010; Milton, Longmore, & Wills, 2008; Pothos, 2005). In line 
with the latter conjecture, exemplar models with a single attention parameter frequently outperform 
models with free attention parameters in generalization tests in the context of estimation tasks (e.g., 
Hoffmann et al., 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008; 2009). That is, when a model is fitted to one 
set of estimates of a participant and the fitted parameters are then used to predict her estimates for a new 
set of cases, the equal-attention exemplar model describes the new estimates better than the more 
complex, unequal-attention model does. These results suggest that the attention weights estimated by a 
full exemplar model will often be too extreme in estimation tasks and that attention is actually spread 
more evenly across the cues. For this reason and to emphasize the conceptual differences between the 
rule- and exemplar-based processes, we focus here on the simplified version of the exemplar model. 
However, in the general discussion we consider to what extent our results may generalize to exemplar 
models with unequal attention weights. 
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Rule model 
Rule-based strategies represent a broad category of strategies that can differ in the complexity of 
the assumed rule-based processes. One universal characteristic of rule-based strategies is that they 
embody a pre-established action routine that can be applied to new cases. This action routine is 
represented as an abstracted set of rules and therefore no longer requires knowledge of concrete past 
experiences (i.e., exemplars). Beyond this universal characteristic, there seems to be no clear consensus 
in cognitive psychology about which strategies can be referred to as “rule-based.” In categorization 
research, rule-based strategies usually refer to if–then rules that involve one or two dimensions and are 
easily verbalized. In estimation research, in contrast, the predominant rule-based strategies are cue 
abstraction strategies that learn the importance of several cues, rather than just one or two (Juslin et al., 
2008; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). Such cue abstraction strategies assume that, for each cue, people abstract 
a weight reflecting its importance for estimation. 
In line with previous research on multiple-cue estimation, we computationally represent a rule-
based estimation process using a cue-abstraction model implemented as a multiple linear regression 
model, which optimizes the cue weights in the learning sample. Such linear additive models have been 
widely and successfully used to approximate human judgment in a broad range of domains (for a 
summary, see Brehmer, 1994). Although linear models could, in principle, incorporate interactions, we 
limited the rule model to consider only main effects, because people do not generally seem to consider 
interactions when making judgments based on multiple cues in a rule-based manner (e.g., Brehmer, 
1994).  
In the rule model, the criterion value ŷ for a new object p is estimated by summing the weighted 
cue values of object p: 
yˆp = k + wj ⋅cjp
1= j
J
∑       (4) 
where wj denotes the weight given to the J cue values c1, ... cj of object p; k is the intercept.  
Strategy Selection versus Strategy Blending: A Normative Perspective 
Drawing on multiple strategies allows a decision maker to adapt to a particular environment by 
using the strategy that performs best (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Todd et al., 2012). In estimation, if 
the criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues, people use exemplar-based strategies because they lead 
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to more accurate judgments than rule-based cue abstraction strategies in these environments. If, in 
contrast, the criterion is a linear function of the cues, people use cue abstraction strategies, which should 
be as accurate as—or more accurate than—exemplar-based strategies (Juslin et al., 2008; Pachur & 
Olsson, 2012; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Accordingly, if there are both nonlinear and linear 
environments—and exemplar-based strategies are therefore superior to cue-abstraction strategies in 
some environments and vice versa in others—choosing the better strategy should lead to higher 
performance across multiple environments than using the same single strategy in every environment—
provided that the ability to identify the better strategy (e.g., based on learning experience) is above 
chance. 
When Is Strategy Selection and When Is Strategy Blending More Accurate? 
Whether and when strategy selection or strategy blending is more accurate is a more complex 
issue. To appreciate the conditions under which blending strategies improves or decreases accuracy 
relative to selecting a strategy, it is useful to view blending strategies as applying the concept of the 
“wisdom of crowds” (Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2004) to a single mind (Herzog & Hertwig, 2014a). 
Blending estimates or decisions from different people or algorithms, and the conditions under which 
blending enhances or decreases accuracy, has been discussed in fields ranging from psychology and 
cognitive science to judgment and decision making, management science, economics, biology, statistics, 
artificial intelligence, and machine learning (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Brown, Wyatt, Harris, & Yao, 2005; 
Davis-Stober, Budescu, Dana, & Broomell, 2014; Grofman, Owen, & Feld, 1983; Hastie & Kameda, 
2005; J. Krause, Ruxton, & Krause, 2010; Kuncheva, 2004; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Larrick, Mannes, & 
Soll, 2012; Lee, Zhang, & Shi, 2011; Luan, Katsikopoulos, & Reimer, 2012; Marling, Sqalli, Rissland, 
Munoz-Avila, & Aha, 2002; Page, 2007; Timmermann, 2006). More recently, the study of the wisdom 
of crowds has been extended to the “inner crowd” (Herzog & Hertwig, 2014a), where several judgments 
from the same person are blended (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; 2014b; Vul & Pashler, 2008). 
Averaging diverse sources (e.g., the forecasts of different experts) leads to higher accuracy than 
randomly selecting among the sources—as long as the sources make different errors that therefore 
cancel each other out, at least partly (Larrick & Soll, 2006). If, on the other hand, the errors are similar, 
averaging will barely increase accuracy over randomly choosing among the sources. The diversity of 
errors is not the sole driver of the benefits of averaging, however. All other things being held constant, 
averaging sources outperforms selecting among them if the differences in accuracy among the sources 
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are small and it is difficult to reliably select the better source in advance (see Herzog & Hertwig, 2014b; 
Soll:2009ie, see also Mannes, Soll, & Larrick, 2014). Applying these insights to the multi-strategy 
framework helps to delineate the conditions under which blending strategies will improve or decrease 
accuracy relative to selecting a strategy: It will depend on (a) the difference in accuracy between the two 
strategies, (b) the ease or difficulty in reliably choosing the better strategy in advance, and (c) the degree 
to which the individual strategies make similar or different errors. We discuss these three points in turn. 
First, the difference in accuracy between exemplar- and rule-based strategies will depend on how 
well the statistical structure of the environment can be represented by either strategy in isolation. The 
linear rule model we are using can well approximate a linear additive function of cues, but it cannot 
approximate a multiplicative function. In contrast, an exemplar model can well approximate a 
multiplicative function of cues. Furthermore, although an exemplar model can also approximate a linear 
additive function of cues, a linear rule model does so better. Fundamentally, a strategy-selection 
approach presupposes that one of the strategies in the toolbox approximates the environment so well that 
it makes sense to prefer it to the others on account of its superior accuracy. Given that rule-based and 
exemplar-based strategies differ in how well they approximate linear and multiplicative structures, this 
raises two questions: (1) Do estimation environments differ strongly enough with respect to those 
statistical characteristics (or do they rather consist of a mixture of linear and multiplicative 
components)? (2) Is the accuracy gain of trying to approximate a particular statistical structure large 
enough to justify changing the estimation strategy? To the extent that the statistical structure of the 
environment cannot be approximated by either an exemplar- or a rule-based strategy in isolation, but 
possibly by a blend of strategies (see Dietterich, 2000), the difference in accuracy between the strategies 
might not be consequential enough to outperform blending. 
Second, the ease or difficulty in reliably choosing the better strategy in advance will depend on 
the amount of experience with the environment and the degree to which one strategy is superior to the 
others (see above). It will often be unclear in advance which strategy is superior; this knowledge 
therefore has to be acquired by experience. Selecting a strategy based on a—possibly small—learning 
sample of past experiences bears the risk of misidentifying the structure of the environment (linear vs. 
multiplicative) and thus betting on the wrong strategy (rule- vs. exemplar-based). The question is 
therefore whether a sufficiently large learning sample has been obtained to allow the sufficiently reliable 
selection of a strategy. Blending strategies may often be “biased” in the sense that it may not be able to 
learn the true underlying function—if the environment happens to be purely linear or purely 
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multiplicative—but blending will also often be more reliable, and thus more robust, than strategy 
selection because it hedges against the risk of selecting the wrong strategy (see also the “bias–variance 
dilemma;” Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2015; Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992; Geurts, 2010; 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).  
Finally, to understand the degree to which the individual strategies will make similar or different 
errors, it is instructive to consider the statistical truism that averaging can improve accuracy by 
canceling out opposing biases, as well as nonredundant unsystematic errors (e.g., Larrick & Soll, 2006; 
Soll, 1999). To the extent that neither strategy can well approximate the statistical structure of an 
environment (see above), there is always the possibility that the strategies exhibit different biases 
because they rely on different representations (exemplars vs. rules), which may approximate different 
aspects of the environment. If so, the strategies’ biases will, at least partly, cancel each other out when 
blending. Irrespective of the fit to the environment, learning a strategy (e.g., the cue weights in the rule 
model) based on possibly limited experience is already a formidable challenge in itself. Because the 
reliability of strategies increases (i.e., the size of unsystematic errors decreases) when they are trained on 
increasingly larger learning samples, strategies should profit from blending, especially when learning 
experience is limited. 
The Complementary Nature of “Lazy” and “Eager” Learning Approaches 
One reason why exemplar and rule models might benefit from a blending approach is that they 
embody fundamentally different approaches to estimation, classification, and decision making. Whereas 
exemplar models belong to the class of “lazy” learning algorithms, rule models belong to the class of 
“eager” learning algorithms. “Lazy” models such as exemplar models do not induce any knowledge 
during learning; they merely store the instances they encounter. It is only when they are prompted with a 
question that they compute their answers based on relevant instances retrieved from memory. This kind 
of approach is very flexible because the task to be solved does not need to be known during learning 
(e.g., Aha, 1997; Juslin & Persson, 2002). “Eager” learning algorithms such as rule models, in contrast, 
abstract knowledge during learning. The task therefore needs to be specified during learning; otherwise 
it remains unclear what knowledge should be abstracted. For example, a cue abstraction model needs to 
know which variable is the criterion variable and which are the cues; it is otherwise unclear which cue 
weights should be learned. 
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A strictly “lazy” approach also has its drawbacks, however (Aha, 1997), especially when 
considering real-world environments. First, “lazy” models need to retain the learning data as their 
knowledge base so that they can compute lazy answers later on. In contrast, “eager” approaches do not 
need to retain the learning data; they have already abstracted the relevant knowledge. Second, the 
flexibility of “lazy” models (in terms of the functional forms they can learn) can make them suffer from 
more variance (Geman et al., 1992; Geurts, 2010) than “eager” models (e.g., Briscoe & Feldman, 2011). 
That is, a “lazy” model’s inference for a particular new object can change dramatically due to small 
changes in the learning data (i.e., overfitting). “Eager” models, in contrast, are typically less flexible, 
that is more biased, than “lazy” models because they necessarily have a priori constraints on what they 
can learn. This is because learning rules or, more generally, abstracting knowledge presupposes a 
representational structure according to which experience is turned into abstracted knowledge (e.g., linear 
relations between cues and criterion in linear models). As the bias–variance dilemma shows, being 
constrained or biased can be a good thing for predictive performance (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2015; 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). 
In sum, “lazy” and “eager” learning algorithms both have their advantages and disadvantages. 
We argue that these advantages and disadvantages typically complement each other and that a blending 
approach is one way to harness this complementarity. 
Overview of Simulation Studies 
We conducted two simulation studies to compare the benefits of strategy selection and strategy 
blending in estimation tasks. In a first step, we constructed three synthetic environments, in which we 
manipulated whether the criterion was a linear or a multiplicative function of the cues or a mixture of 
both. The exemplar-based strategy should be more accurate than the rule-based strategy in the 
multiplicative environment, whereas the rule-based strategy should outperform the exemplar-based 
strategy in the linear environment (e.g., Juslin et al., 2008). The simulation should thus provide some 
insight into how much benefit can be expected from (a) drawing on two strategies rather than relying on 
a single strategy and (b) using strategy blending instead of strategy selection. In a second step, we used a 
collection of five real-world data sets to investigate whether the results can be generalized to real-world 
environments and whether characteristics of those environments influence which multi-strategy 
approach is more accurate. 
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Simulation Study I: 
Performance of Strategy Selection versus Strategy Blending in Synthetic Data Sets 
Synthetic Data Sets 
We created three synthetic data sets: a linear, a multiplicative, and a mixed data set. In the linear 
data set, the criterion is a linear function of the cues; in the multiplicative data set, the criterion is a 
multiplicative function of the cues. We created the mixed data set by taking half of the objects from the 
linear data set and the other half from the multiplicative data set, thus creating a data set that 
incorporates both linear and multiplicative components. 
Each of the data sets consisted of 1,000 objects characterized by six cues and a continuous 
criterion variable. A summary description of the data sets can be found in Table 1. To create the data 
sets, we drew 1,000 objects described by six cues from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of 
zero; the covariances were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 0.15. We then used the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
to convert the cue values to uniformly distributed values between 0 and 1 and multiplied them by 10 to 
achieve uniformly distributed cues with values between 0 and 10. This procedure yielded cue values 
comparable to those used in experimental studies (e.g., Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007). For the linear 
data set, the criterion was created by a linear additive function of the cues (see Hoffmann et al., 2013; 
2014; Juslin et al., 2008): 
Yl = 3.5c1 + 3c2 + 2.5c3 + 2c4 + 1.5c5 + 1c6,     (5) 
where Yl denotes the criterion value and cn the cue values, resulting in deterministic criterion values 
ranging from 0 to 135. For the multiplicative data set, we transformed the linear criterion to obtain a 
criterion that was a multiplicative function of the cues, but that had a similar range of criterion values, 
using the following equation (see also Juslin et al., 2008, for a similar approach): 
Ym = exp(Yl /15) x (max(Yl )/max(exp(Yl /15)))     (6) 
Finally, to introduce irreducible uncertainty (Hammond, 1996), we added to each criterion value 
a random error drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 20. For 
the mixed data set, we created the criterion by randomly drawing half of the criterion values from the 
linear criterion and half from the multiplicative criterion. 
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Simulation Setup 
For each simulation run, we randomly drew a learning sample and a test sample. We then fitted 
the free parameters of the exemplar and the rule model to the learning sample—minimizing the root 
mean square error (RMSE) between model predictions and criterion values—and used the estimated 
parameter values to make predictions for the objects in the test sample (using the six coordination 
schemes described below). We measured estimation accuracy in the test sample using the RMSE 
between the model’s predictions and the criterion values, a commonly used measure of absolute 
goodness of fit. In addition, we used seven different sizes of learning samples (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 200, 
and 500 objects) to vary the amount of experience within an environment. Previous research has shown 
that the size of the learning sample can strongly impact how well strategies generalize (Gigerenzer & 
Brighton, 2009; Perlich, Provost, & Simonoff, 2003). All test samples consisted of 250 objects not 
included in the learning sample. For each data set and each of size of learning sample, we ran the 
simulation 1,000 times and summarized the results by averaging. 
To facilitate interpretation of the results and comparison across data sets, we standardized 
performance using the standard deviation (SD) of the criterion variable in a data set (i.e., Root Mean 
Squared Scaled Error, RMSSE; see also Hyndman & Koehler, 2006).2 That is, separately for each 
environment, we divided the RMSE values of every strategy by the SD of the criterion values of all 
objects in that data set. A value of 1 indicates that a strategy’s error equals this SD. A value below 1 
indicates that a strategy’s error is lower than the SD. For example, a value of 0.8 means that a strategy’s 
RMSE corresponds to 80% of the SD or, put differently, is 20% smaller than the SD. Correspondingly, a 
value above 1 indicates that a strategy’s error is smaller than the SD. For example, a value of 1.1 means 
that a strategy’s RMSE corresponds to 110% of the SD or, put differently, is 10% larger than the SD. If, 
say, strategy A has an RMSSE of 0.80 and strategy B has an RMSSE of 0.81, this means that strategy A 
outperforms strategy B by one percentage point of the SD of the criterion variable. 
Coordinating the Rule- and Exemplar-Based Strategies 
We tested six schemes for coordinating rule- and exemplar-based strategies to make predictions 
for the test sample. The first two schemes used just one of the two strategies exclusively: rule model or 
exemplar model (see introduction for a formal description of the two strategies). 
                                                
2 We used the standard deviation to scale the errors because it measures the deviation from the grand mean on the same scale as the RMSE.  
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In addition, we tested two versions of strategy selection and strategy blending by varying the 
level at which coordination—either selection or blending—takes place: at the task or at the object level. 
In the ecological rationality and adaptive toolbox approach (Todd et al., 2012), it is implicitly assumed 
that the selection of strategies happens at the task level. That is, once learning is completed, all decisions 
within the same task are solved using the same strategy. For instance, strategy selection learning theory 
(SSL) assumes that people learn which strategy is most successful in a specific task—using 
reinforcement learning—and then exploit that strategy (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In real-world 
environments, it may often be difficult to decide whether or not a particular object belongs to a known 
task, but people may learn to use strategies for specific task domains. For example, a doctor may learn to 
rely on one strategy when diagnosing patients but on another when making financial decisions. 
However, strategy selection and blending can also occur at the object level (Erickson, 2008; see 
Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Jacobs, 1999; Jacobs, Jordan, Nowlan, & Hinton, 1991). Some objects may 
be better captured by a rule, whereas others require memorization (Nosofsky et al., 1994), leading 
people to use a rule for one object and an exemplar-based process for another. Similarly, some objects 
may be better captured by a particular process, whereas others may benefit from a blending of both 
processes, suggesting that the extent of blending may differ from object to object. To account for 
coordination at this level, we therefore compared selection and blending at the task and at the object 
level. 
Accordingly, the third and fourth schemes selected either the exemplar or the rule model 
depending on its anticipated success in the test set (selection-task and selection-object, respectively). 
Selection-task picked, in each simulation run, the process that was superior in the learning sample and 
used it for all objects in the test sample. To account for differences in model complexity, we used the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) as a model selection criterion. The BIC is 
commonly used to compare model fit; it takes model complexity into account by penalizing for the 
number of free parameters. We calculated the BIC using the approximation by Raftery (1995), which is 
based on the amount of variance explained by the model (p. 135): 
BICi = n × log(1 – Ri2) + ki × log(n),     (7), 
where n denotes the number of observations, R2 the amount of variance explained, and k the number of 
free parameters of model i. Thus, the smaller the BIC the more parsimoniously the model captures a 
participant’s estimates. 
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In contrast, selection-object picked, in each simulation run and for each object in the test sample, 
the process that was more likely to be superior for that test object—based on its past performance on 
similar objects in the learning sample. Specifically, for each test object, we calculated the absolute error 
e that the exemplar and the rule model made on each object i of the learning sample I and then 
calculated the expected error  as the average error across the learning objects weighted by their 
similarity S to the test object p in question:3 
       (8)
 
The similarity between learning and test objects was calculated in the same way as for the 
exemplar model (see equations 2 and 3), using the parameter values estimated for the exemplar model. 
The response was determined by the relative expected error of the two models, using Luce’s (1959) 
choice rule as a decision rule: 
,      (9)
 
with Pr(p, rule) indicating the probability that the rule model was chosen for test object p, E the 
expected error of the rule model, and M the number of models m from which a response could be 
selected (in this case, the exemplar and the rule model). 
The fifth and sixth scheme blended the outputs of the exemplar and the rule process to make a 
joint prediction (blending-task and blending-object, respectively). At the task level, blending-task 
computed for each test object the arithmetic mean of the predictions of the rule and the exemplar model; 
that is, it treated all objects the same. At the object level, blending-object used in each simulation run 
and for each object in the test sample a weighted average of both models’ predictions:  
yˆp = (1−
E(p,ex)
E(p,m)
m=1
M
∑
) ⋅ yex +
E(p,ex)
E(p,m)
m=1
M
∑
⋅ yrule
,    (10)
 
                                                
3 Note that for a single object, absolute error and RMSE are identical. 
Eˆ
Eˆp =
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i=1
I
∑
S(p, i)
i=1
I
∑
Pr(p, rule) =1− E(p, rule)
E(p,m)
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M
∑
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where yp denotes the response for object p, blending the response of the exemplar model (yex) with the 
response of the rule model (yrule), and E is the expected error of the models m. The weight each model 
received for a specific test object was—as in selection-object—a function of the past performance of the 
two models in the learning sample, weighted by their similarity to the test object under consideration 
(see equation 8).  
Results & Discussion 
Figure 1 and Table 2 show for the three synthetic data sets the average, standardized 
generalization performance of the six coordination schemes as a function of the size of the learning 
sample. Because all schemes performed poorly with the smallest learning sample size (20), and to 
facilitate comparison across strategies, Figure 1 shows only the results for sample sizes from 40 to 500. 
The poor performance with small sample sizes is probably due to overfitting. 
As expected by the design of the data sets, in the linear data set, the rule model outperformed the 
exemplar model at every size of the learning sample. The reverse held for the multiplicative data set 
(compare the left with the right panel of Figure 1), although the advantage of the exemplar model 
decreased with sample size. The advantage of one model over the other ranged from 1 to 6 percentage 
points in the linear data set and from 1 to 15 percentage points in the multiplicative data set (see Table 
2). In the mixed data set, the predictive accuracy of the model depended on the size of the learning 
sample (see middle panel of Figure 1). With small samples (40 and 60), the exemplar model was more 
accurate; with larger samples, the rule model was somewhat more accurate. Taken together, the 
exemplar model seems more robust but less flexible than the rule model—putting it at an advantage in 
terms of predictive accuracy in small sample sizes but at a disadvantage in large sample sizes, which 
allow for reliable estimates of the importance of each cue dimension in the rule model. 
Considering all three data sets together, using either strategy selection or strategy blending was 
superior to consistently relying on just one of the individual strategies (rule or exemplar model). For the 
most part, the performance of the two selection schemes (task or object level) fell between that of the 
exemplar model and the rule model. Strategy blending performed even better (and there were almost no 
differences between blending on the task and object level). In the linear data set, strategy blending 
performed somewhat worse than the rule model, but clearly better than the exemplar model. In the 
multiplicative data set, its performance fell between that of the exemplar and the rule model for the two 
smallest sample sizes and the largest sample size, and it was as accurate as the exemplar model for the 
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intermediate sample sizes. In the mixed data set, the performance of strategy blending fell between that 
of the exemplar model and the rule model for the smallest sample size, it outperformed both for sample 
sizes between 40 and 100, and it performed as well as or only slightly worse than the rule model (the 
better of the two single strategies) for the two largest sample sizes (200 and 500). 
Taken together, these results suggest that blending was the most robust coordination scheme 
overall: Considering all three environments simultaneously, it performed best. Furthermore, assuming 
that purely linear or multiplicative environments are rare in the real world, these results suggest that 
strategy blending should perform well in real-world tasks. To investigate this hypothesis, we conducted 
a second simulation study using five real-world environments.  
Simulation Study II: 
Performance of Strategy Selection versus Strategy Blending in Real-World Environments 
Data Sets 
We analyzed a collection of five real-world data sets that has previously been used to compare 
the performance of proper and improper linear models (Dana & Dawes, 2004; see this reference for 
original references and data sources) using the same simulation setup as in Study I. We chose this 
convenience collection of five data sets for three main reasons. First, the data sets stem from different 
content domains (i.e., biology, sports, public opinion, political sentiment, and occupational prestige). 
Second, the data sets differ in their statistical structure (e.g., linear predictability and distribution of 
criterion values), which may affect the relative accuracy of rule- and exemplar-based processes. Third, 
using a pre-compiled collection of data sets, instead of taking individual data sets from various sources, 
leaves researchers less room for “cherry-picking.”  
In all data sets, a continuous criterion variable was predicted by several cues (see below for 
details). A data set’s statistical structure likely influences the strategies’ performance profiles. As 
possible proxies for the functional relationship between criterion and cues, we considered the proportion 
of linear variance that could be explained by the cues (R2) and the skewness of the distribution of 
criterion values. Table 3 presents details of the data sets’ statistical structure. Multiplicative relationships 
between cues and criterion often lead to highly skewed criteria distributions (often called “J-shaped”) 
and linear rules do not work well in such environments (Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Sparr, 2012; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). 
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In two data sets, the task was to predict peoples’ responses based on their characteristics (ABC 
and NES). In two data sets, the criterion was a measure of success (NFL and WLS); in the final data set, 
the goal was to estimate a biological magnitude. In the following, we describe the data sets in detail.  
• The Abalone data set contains 4,177 cases. The criterion—the age of an abalone (a sea 
snail)—is predicted by seven measurements: shell weight, diameter, height, length, whole 
weight, viscera weight, and shucked weight. 
• The ABC data set contains 955 cases from a random polling of U.S. households by ABC 
News in 2002. The criterion is respondents’ confidence that Osama Bin Laden would be 
captured or killed. The predictors are age, gender, level of education, and whether 
participants regularly displayed the American flag, and how proud they were to be 
American. 
• The NES data set contains 1,910 cases from a telephone poll during the 1988 U.S. 
presidential primary elections. The criterion is how positively the Republican Party was 
rated on a scale from 0 to 100. The six predictors are the answers to poll questions asking 
participants (1) if they thought the nation’s economy was better or worse than the year 
before, (2) if they were financially better or worse off than the year before, and to indicate 
their agreement with the following statements: (3) “If people were treated more equally in 
this country, we would have many fewer problems,” (4) “Changes in lifestyle, like men 
and women living together without being married, are signs of increasing moral decay,” 
(5) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country,” and (6) “We should be 
more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even 
if they are very different from our own.” 
• The NFL data set contains 3,057 cases: the outcomes of the National Football League 
games from 1981 to 1995, excluding strike years. The criterion is the difference in final 
scores (home team minus visiting team) predicted by 10 team statistics: points per game, 
points allowed per game, passing rating, interceptions thrown, total yards of offense, total 
yards allowed, percentage of opponents’ plays ending in a sack, opponents’ average punt 
return, opponents’ average kickoff return, and percentage of plays penalized. 
• The WLS data set includes 6,385 cases taken from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey 
(1993). The criterion is occupational prestige in 1992, predicted by (1) a measure of 
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physical health, (2) number of children and measures of (3) depression, (4) extraversion, 
and (5) neuroticism. 
Results & Discussion 
As shown in Figure 2, in most data sets, most models had errors smaller than the standard 
deviation of the criterion variable (i.e., had RMSSEs < 1) once the size of the learning sample was 40 or 
larger (see also Table 4). At the largest sample size (500), the decreases in error ranged between 2 and 
30 percentage points. The largest decrease was in the Abalone data set; the smallest in the WLS data set. 
The poor performance with small sample sizes was probably due to overfitting, in particular for the rule 
model, which had the largest number of free parameters. Furthermore, in some data sets, the criterion 
could not be predicted very well by the cues (e.g., WLS; see R2 values in Table 3), making it difficult for 
the models to have RMSSEs < 1 (an RMSSE > 1 means that using the grand mean of all criterion values 
as the same estimate for all objects was more accurate than the model’s estimates). 
Across data sets, the exemplar model outperformed the rule model at small sample sizes (20 and 
40), but the rule model caught up and performed as well as or better than the exemplar model at larger 
sample sizes (Figure 2, summary panel, upper left); this pattern of performance is similar to that 
observed in the mixed data set in our simulation study (Figure 1, middle panel). The data sets differed 
with respect to which of the two models performed best. The rule model outperformed the exemplar 
model in the Abalone and the ABC data sets, whereas the exemplar model outperformed the rule model 
in the WLS data set. In the NFL and the NES data sets, the exemplar model was more accurate with 
smaller samples, but the rule model was more accurate with larger samples. This variation does not seem 
to be related to whether the task was to predict a human response (e.g., ABC: a response in a poll) or a 
nonsocial criterion (e.g., Abalone: the age of an abalone snail), suggesting that the statistical structure of 
the task is more important than the domain. Consistent with this conjecture, the average Spearman 
correlation across data sets between (a) the difference in accuracy between the rule and the exemplar 
model and (b) the amount of linear variance explained by the cues (R2)—calculated per sample size and 
then averaged—was rS = .73, SD = .31, which suggests that the rule model had an advantage over the 
exemplar model in tasks that were linearly predictable.  
Comparable to our findings for the synthetic data sets, the performance of the two strategy-
selection schemes mostly fell between that of the exemplar and the rule model (i.e., the strategy-
selection schemes were more accurate than the inferior of the two individual strategies in any task, but 
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less accurate than the superior of the two). However, the performance of the two strategy-selection 
schemes differed among data sets and was sometimes worse than, or as bad as, the inferior of the two 
individual strategies. This suggests that it was not possible to reliably identify the superior strategy 
based on learning experience. Nevertheless, it was advantageous to rely on a multi-strategy approach 
because neither the exemplar model nor the rule model was consistently the best strategy, and even 
unreliably selecting among strategies was better than not switching at all.  
However, the two strategy-selection schemes were outperformed by the two strategy-blending 
schemes. A simple blend of the two individual strategies (blending-task) outperformed both strategy-
selection schemes (selection-task and selection-object) in four of the five data sets (for all sample sizes > 
20). Overall, the advantage of strategy blending over strategy selection was relatively stable across 
sample sizes, whereas the absolute difference in accuracy between the exemplar and the rule model was 
much larger for small than for large samples. This shows that the advantage of strategy blending over 
strategy selection was not just a function of the difference in accuracy of the exemplar and rule model; 
otherwise, the advantage of strategy blending over strategy selection would have shown a similar 
decline as sample sizes increased. It seems possible that the effect of the large differences in accuracy 
between the exemplar and rule model for smaller samples was offset by the difficulty in identifying the 
better strategy with such small samples.  
Although strategy blending performed worse than the exemplar model at the smallest sample size 
(20), when summarized across environments, blending-task was about 1 to 2 percentage points better 
than the superior of the two individual strategies in the range of 40 to 200 training objects and equally 
good with 500 training objects (see Figure 2, summary panel; and Table 4). Blending outperformed the 
rule model at medium to small sample sizes in all data sets (i.e., sample sizes < 200); even with large 
samples, its performance was as good or only slightly worse. In comparison with the exemplar model, 
blending was less accurate for small samples, but more accurate at sample sizes of 40 or larger in all but 
one data set. Overall, the differences between data sets were relatively small, with the largest benefit of 
blending in the Abalone data set (around 4 percentage points for medium-sized samples) and the 
smallest benefit in the WLS data set, where blending performed only at the level of the exemplar model 
(which was more accurate than the rule model in this data set). 
The advantage of strategy blending was not systematically related to any of the statistical 
characteristics of the data sets. Spearman correlations across the five real-world data sets and the three 
synthetic data sets between the performance gain of blending rather than using the better of the two 
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individual strategies (rule or exemplar model) and either (a) linear predictability or (b) skewness did not 
show a coherent pattern. Correlations varied strongly with sample size and were, on average, of medium 
size (linear predictability: Md = –.42, interquantile range or IQR = .52; skewness: Md = –.38, IQR = 
.46). Given the small number of data sets on which this analysis relies, we conclude that there is, at least, 
no indication of a strong relationship between the statistical characteristics of the data sets and the 
benefits of strategy blending. Finally, although the advantage of strategy blending was largest in the 
Abalone data set, it does not seem that the benefits of blending are restricted to nonsocial estimation 
problems. 
Across data sets, there was no clear difference between the task- and object-based coordination 
schemes. For strategy blending, a simple blend of the strategies (i.e., the simple average of the two 
strategies’ responses; blending-task) and a weighted blend of the strategies (i.e., weighted average 
according to the two strategies’ past performance on similar objects; blending-object) performed roughly 
the same. For strategy selection, whether using the same strategy for all objects (selection-task) or 
selecting the strategy according to its past performance on similar objects (selection-object) showed the 
better performance differed among environments. 
Which strategies performed best overall? When summarized across the seven sizes of learning 
samples, the results will depend partly on the particular choices of sample sizes used (20, 40, 60, 80, 
100, 200, and 500). Nevertheless, giving an overall impression may be desirable (see Table 4): 
Blending-task and blending-object were most often among the best-performing strategies (83% and 60% 
of data-set–sample-size combinations, respectively), whereas all other strategies lagged behind on this 
measure of success: exemplar model (29%), selection-task (17%), rule-model (14%) and selection-
object (0%).  
General Discussion 
Many cognitive models of estimation, categorization, and decision-making assume that the same 
person can use both exemplar- and rule-based strategies to solve the same task (e.g., Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998). Yet it has remained unclear whether using both strategies provides an advantage over 
using just one strategy and, when both strategies are available, whether it is better to select a single 
strategy or to blend multiple strategies—depending on the task or even on the object within the task. Our 
simulations using synthetic and real-world environments indicate that multi-strategy approaches, such as 
strategy selection and strategy blending, lead to more accurate estimates than relying on just one strategy 
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across all environments. One reason for the advantage of multi-strategy approaches seems to be that 
natural environments are sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to whether rule-based or exemplar-
based strategies render more accurate estimates; therefore, using both strategies improves performance.  
Should a judge select one strategy or blend the responses of both strategies? Our findings suggest 
that—with the exception of very small learning samples—selecting the strategy that performed best in 
the learning sample is less accurate than blending the responses of the two strategies. With medium-
sized learning samples, strategy blending not only outperformed strategy selection, but was also more 
accurate than either the exemplar or the rule model by about 2 percentage points. Although, at first 
glance, this difference may not seem consequential, it is comparable to the differences in accuracy 
between the rule and the exemplar model across environments and sample sizes. Furthermore, even 
small increases in performance can be relevant when benefits accumulate over time (e.g., Haldane, 
1927). 
Why does blending strategies perform so well? The inferior performance of the strategy-selection 
schemes suggests that it may often be difficult to identify—reliably enough—which of the two strategies 
would generalize better (see Soll & Larrick, 2009), based on their performance in the learning samples. 
Blending seems to offer a robust compromise that allows people to benefit from the two estimation 
strategies’ abilities to exploit different aspects of the environment. This, in turn, allows the two 
estimation strategies to make different kinds of errors, which are—at least partly—cancelled out when 
their estimates are blended. However, our results also indicate boundary conditions for blending: With 
very small learning samples, the exemplar model outperformed the rule model to such a degree that 
incorporating the rule model’s estimates by blending decreased performance relative to relying solely on 
the exemplar model. Similarly, with large samples, blending the exemplar and the rule model did not 
help much, presumably because both strategies made very similar predictions, leading to highly 
correlated errors. 
Can our findings on the benefits of strategy blending be generalized to other estimation 
strategies, to categorization strategies, and to other domains of human behavior? The benefits of the 
multi-strategy blending approach seem to stem from the mixture of statistical structures found in real-
world environments, which cannot be captured by a single process in isolation (see Dietterich, 2000), 
from the nonredundant errors of the two qualitatively different cognitive processes (Herzog & Hertwig, 
2009; 2014a), and from the difficulty people evidently have in selecting the—sometimes only slightly—
more accurate process based on past experience (Mannes et al., 2014; Soll & Larrick, 2009). This 
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suggests that our results should generalize to other domains—such as categorization, decision making, 
or problem solving (e.g., Page, 2007)—to the degree that these conditions are fulfilled.  
Cognitive Modeling and Predictive Simulations 
The goal of our simulations—using stylized estimation strategies—was to provide an existence 
proof that people might benefit not only from adaptively switching between estimation strategies, but 
also from blending them. Such a strategy blending approach can provide accuracy benefits that go 
beyond exploiting the fact that different strategies work best in different environments (Todd et al., 
2012). One question, however, is to what extent our simulation results, which relied on one specific 
implementation each of a rule- and an exemplar-based process, can be generalized to human estimation 
processes more generally. The answer depends on whether our model implementations captured the 
relevant aspects of human estimation and learning.   
One question is whether implementing the exemplar model with unequal attention weights 
would have been more appropriate than the equal-attention version we used. As discussed above, if 
human participants learned to solve the tasks we simulated using an exemplar approach, their attention 
weights would probably fall in between the equal weights we assumed and the more dispersed, 
optimized attention weights that a model with free parameters would estimate. This, in turn, suggests 
that fitting an exemplar model with free attention parameters would overestimate the differences in 
attention across cues, possibly more so than using equal weights would underestimate the respective 
differences. One solution for future research would be, instead of using optimized attention weights, to 
specify learning models that can capture how people learn to allocate attention. Although some learning 
models exist in categorization (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Kruschke, 1992), there is as yet relatively 
little such work in estimation (for notable exceptions, see Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Speekenbrink & 
Shanks, 2010). Such specifications would allow for more accurate simulation of the learning and 
selection processes in multi-strategy accounts of human judgment.  
Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to discuss how our results would be affected by using a more 
flexible exemplar model. For one, the higher generalization performance of the exemplar model—
relative to the rule model—when trained on only small learning samples is probably partly due to the 
constraints imposed by its simplicity. That is, an exemplar model with a separate, free attention 
parameter for each cue dimension would probably overfit with small samples, but might generalize 
better with larger samples. In addition, there is the possibility that using an exemplar model with free 
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attention parameters would decrease the advantage of strategy blending over strategy selection. To the 
extent that both models are able to estimate the importance of a specific cue dimension accurately from 
the learning sample, this could increase the correlation between predictions and thus make blending less 
successful. However, because exemplar-based processes differ from rule-based processes in 
representation and information processing (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002), richer, 
more cognitive implementations of such models should arguably also reflect said differences—possibly 
even more so. Accordingly, using such more cognitive implementations may also accentuate error 
cancellation through blending and thus amplify the results found in the present study. 
Environmental Structure and Multi-Strategy Accounts of Judgment 
In the mixed environment consisting of a mixture of linear and multiplicative components, we 
found that the exemplar model was more accurate for small sample sizes, but that the rule model was 
more accurate for larger sample sizes. In the real-world data sets, the degree to which the rule model 
outperformed the exemplar model correlated positively with the proportion of linear variance explained 
by the cues in a data set. Although a low linear predictability could also indicate that the cues simply did 
not allow for accurate prediction of the criterion—either linearly or nonlinearly—the result is consistent 
with the conjecture that linear predictability is a key characteristic distinguishing between environments 
in which the rule model outperforms the exemplar model and vice versa. 
Real-world environments might not consist of purely linear or multiplicative components, 
however, but might represent a mixture of both components. The difference in performance between the 
exemplar and rule model across the real-world data sets was smaller than that in the synthetic linear and 
multiplicative data sets, which is consistent with what one would expect if environments are not purely 
linear or multiplicative. Furthermore, overall, the pattern of performance in the real-world data sets was 
most similar to that in the mixed synthetic data set, which is also consistent with the conjecture that real-
world environments are often not purely linear or multiplicative. If this were indeed the case, it would 
render strategy blending successful in real-world environments because neither strategy in isolation can 
capture the statistical structure of the environment (Dietterich, 2000). Consistent with this conjecture, 
blending was more successful in the mixed synthetic data set and in the real-world data sets than in the 
purely linear and purely multiplicative synthetic data sets. However, we must emphasize that this is 
currently only a conjecture. Our simulations can only provide tentative answers given (a) that it is not 
clear how to best measure linear and multiplicative components in natural data sets and (b) that we 
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investigated only a handful of environments; a collection of a few dozen environments would seem 
necessary to derive reliable conclusions. 
Although the real-world data sets varied in many respects—including their linear predictability, 
the relative accuracy of the rule and exemplar model, the number of cues, the skewness of the criterion 
variable, and whether the criterion was human response or natural observations—we found relatively 
little variance in the benefits of strategy blending across data sets. The Abalone data set was most 
distinct in that it was best predicted by a linear model, but was also most skewed and was the only 
completely nonsocial data set. However, the benefits of strategy blending were not restricted to 
nonsocial data, and our simulation with synthetic data sets suggests that statistical characteristics may be 
more important than the domain content in determining which strategy works best. Further research on 
the statistical features that render strategy selection or strategy blending more successful is necessary.  
Psychological Insights and the Merits of a Normative Perspective 
At first sight, blending the responses of different processes or strategies may not seem a 
parsimonious approach because it requires that at least two processes are adopted simultaneously. 
However, this assumption is shared by many strategy-selection accounts. Whereas in strategy selection 
the better or faster response is selected and the other response is ignored, in strategy blending both 
responses are integrated. Furthermore, the idea that people rely on both exemplar- and rule-based 
processes is in line with both the empirical evidence and, more broadly, the historical development in 
the literature on computational modeling approaches, from models positing a single process (e.g., 
Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000) to models integrating rule- and 
exemplar-based processes. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that exemplar similarity influences 
responses even if a rule suffices to solve the task and if people clearly rely on a rule when making their 
judgments (Brooks & Hannah, 2006; Hahn et al., 2010; von Helversen et al., 2014)—a result that is 
implied by a strategy blending approach, but is difficult to reconcile with strategy selection accounts. 
These descriptive results resonate with our results, which suggest that in many real-world environments 
it is beneficial to rely on both processes at the same time. In addition, our results suggest that strategy 
blending could be particularly useful with medium-sized learning samples. One reason could be that, in 
these situations, people have experienced some exemplars that they can retrieve from memory, but have 
not yet gained enough experience to abstract a reliable, successful rule. However, more empirical and 
modeling research is necessary to understand when and how people might blend the responses from 
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exemplar- and rule-based processes. Furthermore, we implemented blending as a simple average of the 
two strategies’ responses, which ignores learning processes. Future research should consider 
psychologically plausible implementations of how the responses of two strategies are blended. For 
example, it would be interesting to implement the blending of exemplar- and rule-based processes 
within a unitary framework such as ACT-R (Anderson, 1990; Anderson et al., 2004; see also Anderson 
& Betz, 2001, for an implementation that essentially assumes a race between exemplar and rule-based 
production rules), using, for example, blended retrieval of chunks or production compilation (i.e., 
creation of new production rules; Anderson et al., 2004; Thomson et al., 2015). 
In general, a normative perspective has merits for research in psychology and judgment and 
decision making (JDM). Examining the ability of cognitive models to predict real-world criteria goes a 
step further than comparing their ability to describe human behavior in idealized laboratory tasks (see 
Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). Our results suggest that it does not pay off to tune one’s use of 
exemplar- and rule-based processes to the type of object one wants to generalize to within the same task. 
This conclusion seems inconsistent with empirical studies suggesting that participants successfully 
switch between processes in categorization tasks (e.g., Erickson, 2008). Yet these experimental tasks 
may be unrepresentative of real-world environments. In many experimental studies—especially in 
categorization research—there is typically little (or no) doubt about which process is better suited to 
solving the overall task (or responding to a specific object), because there is no irreducible uncertainty 
(i.e., no noise and thus the relationship between cues and criterion could, in principle, be learned 
perfectly) and participants are provided with ample learning experience on typically only a small 
number of cues. Participants can thus easily learn to select between or differentially use the two 
processes. We speculate that deviating from a simple blending strategy is generally worthwhile only in 
environments in which one process is clearly superior to the other, both processes make similar errors, 
and it is possible to ascertain this statistical structure with enough confidence (see Herzog & Hertwig, 
2014b; Soll & Larrick, 2009). We would argue, however, that this is typically not the case in real-world 
environments, because there is usually irreducible uncertainty, and learning experience is often limited. 
It would thus seem prudent that human judges and decision makers, as modeled, for example, by 
ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998), start with a simple blend of both processes and deviate from 
this approach (e.g., by selection or object-specific tuning) only when feedback justifies it. In addition, 
understanding the complementary strengths and weaknesses of different cognitive processes from a 
crowd-within perspective (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; 2014a; 2014b) could offer ways of improving 
human estimation, categorization, and decision making by boosting decision makers’ predictive skills 
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through instructing them when and how to select or blend exemplar-based and rule-based processes, in 
particular, and different cognitive processes, in general. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the synthetic data sets 
Data set Criterion (mean) Criterion (range) Cue–criterion 
correlations 
R2 Skew 
Linear 61 –18, 147 .47, .38, .34, .25, .13, .12  .45 0.09 
Multiplicative 6 –52, 106 .22, .13, .12, .09, .08, .07 .08 0.33 
Mixed 33 –52, 147 .25, .19, .16, .15, .06, .05 .12 0.20 
Note. N = 1,000; Number of cues = 6; R2 = percentage of linear variance explained. Skew = Pearson’s moment coefficient of 
skewness of the data set. 
 
Table 2. Cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy of the six coordination schemes in three synthetic data sets  
  Sample size 
Data set Strategy 20 40 60 80 100 200 500 
Linear 
Rule model 0.917[3] 0.816[2] 0.788[1] 0.778[1] 0.769[1] 0.757[1] 0.748[1] 
Exemplar model 0.929[3] 0.870[2] 0.845[1] 0.835[1] 0.826[1] 0.805[1] 0.786[1] 
Selection-task 0.945[3] 0.865[2] 0.837[2] 0.823[1] 0.809[1] 0.778[1] 0.752[1] 
Selection-object 0.923[3] 0.825[2] 0.800[1] 0.792[1] 0.783[1] 0.770[1] 0.762[1] 
Blending-task 0.871[2] 0.813[1] 0.792[1] 0.786[1] 0.779[1] 0.767[1] 0.757[1] 
Blending-object 0.884[3] 0.811[1] 0.791[1] 0.784[1] 0.777[1] 0.766[1] 0.757[1] 
Mixed 
Rule model 1.162[4] 1.034[2] 0.998[1] 0.984[1] 0.977[1] 0.958[1] 0.950[1] 
Exemplar model 1.036[2] 1.002[2] 0.990[1] 0.985[1] 0.981[1] 0.969[1] 0.961[1] 
Selection-task 1.050[3] 1.004[2] 0.990[1] 0.985[1] 0.981[1] 0.969[1] 0.961[1] 
Selection-object 1.161[4] 1.036[2] 1.000[1] 0.986[1] 0.979[1] 0.961[1] 0.954[1] 
Blending-task 1.054[2] 0.996[1] 0.979[1] 0.973[1] 0.969[1] 0.957[1] 0.952[1] 
Blending-object 1.079[3] 1.001[2] 0.980[1] 0.973[1] 0.969[1] 0.957[1] 0.952[1] 
Multiplicative 
Rule model 1.193[5] 1.058[2] 1.022[2] 1.005[1] 1.000[1] 0.979[1] 0.970[1] 
Exemplar model 1.040[3] 1.007[2] 0.996[1] 0.989[1] 0.985[1] 0.968[1] 0.955[1] 
Selection-task 1.050[3] 1.007[2] 0.996[1] 0.989[1] 0.985[1] 0.968[1] 0.955[1] 
Selection-object 1.190[5] 1.054[2] 1.019[2] 1.002[1] 0.996[1] 0.973[1] 0.958[1] 
Blending-task 1.073[3] 1.012[2] 0.995[1] 0.986[1] 0.984[1] 0.967[1] 0.957[1] 
Blending-object 1.100[3] 1.016[2] 0.996[1] 0.987[1] 0.984[1] 0.967[1] 0.957[1] 
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Note. The values show the cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy (RMSSE) of the six coordination schemes in the three synthetic data sets (linear, mixed, 
and multiplicative) for learning samples of different sizes. The single digits in square brackets indicate the third digit of the standard error of the RMSSE (e.g., 
“0.971[3]” indicates 0.971±0.003). For each data set and sample size, the strategies performing best (i.e., within 2 standard errors of the best-performing strategy) are 
highlighted in bold. See main text for details on the coordination schemes and data sets. 
 
  
Table 3. Characteristics of the real-world data sets (adapted from Table 1 in Dana & Dawes, 2004) 
Data set 
N k 
v Vector ∅rxixj R2 Skew 
Abalone 4,177 7 .63 .58 .56 .56 .54 .50 .42 .89 0.53 1.11 
ABC 955 5 .32 .20 .06 .04 .02 .08 0.12 0.33 
NFL 3,057 10 .46 .43 .37 .34 .33 .27 .21 .07 .05 .05 .21 0.29 -0.01 
NES 1,910 6 .26 .17 .15 .15 .13 .12 .11 0.12 -0.41 
WLS 6,385 5 .13 .11 .10 .10 .10 .15 0.04 -0.26 
Note. N = number of cases, k = number of cues, v Vector = zero-order correlation between target variable and cues, ∅rxixj = 
mean intercorrelation among cues, R2 = percentage of linear variance explained, Skew = Pearson’s moment coefficient of 
skewness of the data set. 
 
 
Table 4. Cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy of the six coordination schemes in the five real-world data sets 
  Sample size 
Data set Strategy 20 40 60 80 100 200 500 
Summary 
Rule model (5/35) 1.155 0.991 0.946 0.928 0.918 0.897 0.886 
Exemplar model (10/35) 0.995 0.960 0.943 0.934 0.928 0.912 0.899 
Selection-task (6/35) 1.029 0.962 0.941 0.931 0.924 0.908 0.896 
Selection-object (0/35) 1.151 0.993 0.949 0.932 0.922 0.902 0.890 
Blending-task (29/35) 1.009 0.941 0.920 0.911 0.905 0.892 0.884 
Blending-object (21/35) 1.057 0.949 0.922 0.913 0.906 0.893 0.884 
Abalone 
Rule model 0.999[9] 0.826[5] 0.767[3] 0.750[3] 0.740[3] 0.710[2] 0.699[2] 
Exemplar model 0.888[3] 0.839[3] 0.809[2] 0.794[2] 0.784[2] 0.747[2] 0.724[2] 
Selection-task 0.970[8] 0.846[3] 0.799[3] 0.779[3] 0.764[3] 0.725[2] 0.705[2] 
Selection-object 0.991[9] 0.832[4] 0.777[3] 0.759[3] 0.753[3] 0.721[2] 0.706[2] 
Blending-task 0.837[4] 0.764[2] 0.734[2] 0.725[2] 0.720[2] 0.697[2] 0.688[2] 
Blending-object 0.905[6] 0.781[3] 0.741[2] 0.729[2] 0.724[2] 0.700[2] 0.690[2] 
NFL 
Rule model 1.268[8] 0.996[3] 0.936[2] 0.911[2] 0.896[1] 0.867[1] 0.856[1] 
Exemplar model 0.972[2] 0.937[2] 0.920[2] 0.910[1] 0.904[1] 0.890[1] 0.881[1] 
Selection-task 1.019[6] 0.937[2] 0.920[2] 0.910[1] 0.904[1] 0.890[1] 0.880[1] 
Selection-object 1.263[8] 0.996[3] 0.938[2] 0.914[2] 0.900[1] 0.873[1] 0.862[1] 
Blending-task 1.029[3] 0.925[2] 0.900[1] 0.888[1] 0.881[1] 0.866[1] 0.859[1] 
Blending-object 1.127[6] 0.937[2] 0.903[2] 0.890[1] 0.881[1] 0.866[1] 0.859[1] 
ABC 
Rule model 1.148[5] 1.021[2] 0.985[1] 0.976[1] 0.967[1] 0.951[1] 0.944[1] 
Exemplar model 1.040[2] 1.006[2] 0.991[1] 0.985[1] 0.979[1] 0.967[1] 0.956[1] 
Selection-task 1.053[3] 1.007[2] 0.992[1] 0.986[1] 0.979[1] 0.967[1] 0.956[1] 
Selection-object 1.146[5] 1.024[2] 0.988[1] 0.979[1] 0.971[1] 0.957[1] 0.949[1] 
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Blending-task 1.049[3] 0.993[1] 0.974[1] 0.968[1] 0.962[1] 0.952[1] 0.945[1] 
Blending-object 1.071[3] 0.996[2] 0.974[1] 0.969[1] 0.963[1] 0.953[1] 0.946[1] 
NES 
Rule model 1.167[5] 1.041[2] 1.003[2] 0.985[2] 0.973[2] 0.960[1] 0.946[1] 
Exemplar model 1.032[3] 1.000[2] 0.987[2] 0.978[2] 0.971[2] 0.964[1] 0.951[1] 
Selection-task 1.050[4] 1.001[2] 0.987[2] 0.978[2] 0.971[2] 0.964[1] 0.951[1] 
Selection-object 1.165[5] 1.042[2] 1.004[2] 0.987[2] 0.974[2] 0.962[1] 0.948[1] 
Blending-task 1.054[3] 0.999[2] 0.980[2] 0.970[2] 0.962[1] 0.956[1] 0.945[1] 
Blending-object 1.082[3] 1.004[2] 0.982[2] 0.971[2] 0.963[1] 0.956[1] 0.945[1] 
WLS 
Rule model 1.191[4] 1.069[2] 1.038[2] 1.021[1] 1.012[1] 0.995[1] 0.986[1] 
Exemplar model 1.044[2] 1.019[1] 1.008[1] 1.004[1] 1.000[1] 0.992[1] 0.985[1] 
Selection-task 1.053[3] 1.020[2] 1.008[1] 1.004[1] 1.000[1] 0.992[1] 0.985[1] 
Selection-object 1.191[4] 1.070[2] 1.038[2] 1.021[1] 1.013[1] 0.995[1] 0.986[1] 
Blending-task 1.078[3] 1.026[1] 1.010[1] 1.003[1] 0.999[1] 0.989[1] 0.983[1] 
Blending-object 1.101[3] 1.030[2] 1.012[1] 1.004[1] 0.999[1] 0.990[1] 0.983[1] 
Note. The values show the cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy (RMSSE) of the six coordination schemes in the five real-world data sets (including a 
summary across data sets) for learning samples of different sizes. The single digits in squared brackets indicate the third digit of the standard error of the RMSSE 
(e.g., “0.999[9]” indicates 0.999±0.009). For each data set and sample size, the strategies performing best (i.e., within 2 standard errors of the best-performing 
strategy) are highlighted in bold. In the Summary section, the relative frequencies in parentheses following the strategy names indicate how often each strategy was 
among the best-performing strategies across the five data sets and seven sizes of learning samples. See main text for details on the coordination schemes and data sets. 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy (RMSSE) of the six coordination schemes in 
three synthetic data sets (linear, mixed, and multiplicative) for learning samples of increasing size (x-
axis scaled by the natural logarithm). The symbols are slightly jittered horizontally to avoid overplotting. 
Because the scaling of the y-axis differs across panels, we include a horizontal, dotted line at y = 1 to 
facilitate comparisons across data sets. 
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Figure 2. Cross-validated standardized estimation accuracy (RMSSE) of the six coordination schemes in 
five data sets for learning samples of increasing size (x-axis scaled by the natural logarithm). The 
summary panel (upper left) averages the RMSSE values across data sets. The points are slightly jittered 
horizontally to avoid overplotting. Because the scaling of the y-axis differs across panels, we include a 
horizontal, dotted line at y = 1 to facilitate comparisons across data sets. 
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